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ABSTRACT   14 
 Accidents in twin-engine aircraft carry a higher risk of fatality compared with single engine 15 
aircraft and constitute 9% of all general aviation accidents. The different flight profile (higher airspeed, 16 
service ceiling, increased fuel load, and aircraft yaw in engine failure) may make comparable studies on 17 
single-engine aircraft accident causes less relevant. The objective of this study was to identify the 18 
accident causes for non-commercial operations in twin engine aircraft.  19 
A NTSB accident database query for accidents in twin piston engine airplanes of 4-8 seat 20 
capacity with a maximum certified weight of 3,000-8000 lbs. operating under 14CFR Part 91 for the 21 
period spanning 2002 and 2012 returned 376 accidents. Accident causes and contributing factors were as 22 
per the NTSB final report categories. Total annual flight hour data for the twin engine piston aircraft fleet 23 
were obtained from the FAA. Statistical analyses employed Chi Square, Fisher’s Exact and logistic 24 
regression analysis.  25 
Neither the combined fatal/non-fatal accident nor the fatal accident rate declined over the period 26 
spanning 2002-2012. Under visual weather conditions, the largest number, n=27, (27%) of fatal accidents 27 
was attributed to malfunction with a failure to follow single engine procedures representing the most 28 
common contributing factor. In degraded visibility, poor instrument approach procedures resulted in the 29 
greatest proportion of fatal crashes. Encountering thunderstorms was the most lethal of all accident causes 30 
with all occupants sustaining fatal injuries. At night, a failure to maintain obstacle/terrain clearance was 31 
the most common accident cause leading to 36% of fatal crashes. The results of logistic regression 32 
showed that operations at night (OR 3.7), off airport landings (OR 14.8) and post-impact fire (OR 7.2) all 33 
carried an excess risk of a fatal flight.  34 
This study indicates training areas that should receive increased emphasis for twin-engine 35 
training/recency. First, increased training should be provided on single engine procedures in the event of 36 
an engine failure. Second, more focus should be placed on instrument approaches and recovery from 37 
unusual aircraft attitude where visibility is degraded. Third, pilots should be made aware of appropriate 38 
speed selection for inadvertent flights in convective weather. Finally, emphasizing the importance of 39 
conducting night operations under instrument flight rules with its altitude restrictions should lead to a 40 
diminished proportion of accidents attributed to failure to maintain obstacle/terrain clearance. 41 
 42 




 THE FATAL ACCIDENT RATE IN GA TWIN-ENGINE AIRPLANES IS UNCHANGED FOR 45 
2002-2012. 46 
  A MALFUNCTION WAS ONE OF THE MOST FREQUENT CAUSES OF A FATAL 47 
ACCIDENT. 48 
 IMPROPER SINGLE ENGINE PROCEDURES UPON POWER LOSS OFTEN LED TO 49 
FATAL ACCIDENTS. 50 
 ALL NIGHT OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER INSTRUMENT FLIGHT 51 
RULES. 52 
 53 
Keywords: aviation accidents, general aviation, fatal accidents, multi-engine aircraft.  54 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 55 
 General aviation (14CFR Part 91) includes all civilian aviation with the exception of operations 56 
involving paid passenger transport the latter covered under 14CFR Part 121 and 135. 14CFR Part 91 57 
refers to a set of FAA regulations that govern the operation of small, non-commercial aircraft within the 58 
United States (http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?node=14:2.0.1.3.10) whereas 14CFR Part 121 and 59 
135 are the comparable but more stringent rules applying to airlines and air-taxi operations respectively. 60 
Although accidents for the airlines have dramatically declined over the last decade [15], such a decrease 61 
has not been witnessed in general aviation. In fact, general aviation accounts for the overwhelming 62 
majority (94%) of civil aviation fatalities in the United States [13,15] and represents one of the last 63 
unresolved safety challenges for aviation. Furthermore general aviation accidents carry an associated 64 
annual cost of $1.6-4.6 billion to individuals and institutions affected (e.g. family and non-family 65 
incurring injury and/or loss of life, insurance companies, accident investigation costs) when taking into 66 
account hospital costs, loss of pay with a fatal accident and loss of the aircraft [27]. In all likelihood these 67 
costs would be even higher were litigation costs assessed as well. 68 
 Approximately 7% of the general aviation fleet is comprised of multi-engine piston aircraft. 69 
Moreover, of all general aviation accidents 9% occur in twin-engine, piston-powered aircraft [13]. 70 
General aviation accidents in these aircraft carry a higher risk of fatality compared with single engine 71 
aircraft [13]. Although the reason for the higher fatality rate is unknown several factors may contribute. 72 
First, these aircraft typically have a higher airspeed, service ceiling and carry an increased fuel load (and 73 
therefore increased potential for a post-impact fire). Second, unlike a single engine aircraft, an engine 74 
failure in a twin-engine airplane (with the exception of aircraft with centerline thrust twin engines) creates 75 
a yawing tendency due to the asymmetrical thrust a characteristic which may enhance the chance of an 76 
aerodynamic stall. Conversely, multi-engine aviators are likely to have more aviation experience than 77 
pilots flying single engine aircraft. These differences may make prior studies on single-engine aircraft 78 
accident causes less relevant.  79 
 Although there are several published studies on general aviation fatal crashes [3,6,9,15], to the 80 
knowledge of the author, none have specifically focused on the causes and temporal changes for twin-81 
engine piston aircraft operating under the 14CFR Part 91 umbrella. With few exceptions [24,25], research 82 
on aviation accidents typically aggregate single and multiple engine-powered aircraft [10,14,19,29]. In 83 
addition, there is also the tendency of studies to cite general (e.g. pilot error, pilot-related) [6,16,26] rather 84 
than specific causes. Where specific accident causes are provided, studies often fail to distinguish 85 
between single and multi-engine aircraft. The Joseph T. Nall report (hereafter referred to as the Nall 86 
report) compiled by The Air Safety Institute (http://www.aopa.org/Pilot-Resources/Safety-and-87 
Technique/Accident-Analysis/Joseph-T-Nall-Report) is a biennial report on general aviation accidents. 88 
While extremely comprehensive, the Nall report documents several accident causes (e.g. fuel 89 
mismanagement, aerodynamic stalls, failure to maintain obstacle/terrain clearance, thunderstorms, 90 
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instrument approach deficiencies, failure to maintain control and spatial disorientation) across the entire 91 
general aviation fixed-wing fleet with little distinction between single and multi-engine aircraft. 92 
Additionally, this report fails to identify risk factors that may also contribute to fatal crashes.  The 93 
objective of the current study was to determine the causes of fatal and non-fatal accidents in twin-piston 94 
engine powered airplanes operating under 14CFR Part 91 as well as to identify risk factors for fatal 95 
crashes for the period spanning 2002-2012.  96 
2.0 METHODS 97 
The NTSB (2014 Aug release) Access database was downloaded 98 
(http://www.ntsb.gov/avdata/Access/) and queried for accidents occurring for the period spanning 2002 99 
and 2012 in twin piston engine aircraft (airplane category) of 4-8 seat capacity with a maximum certified 100 
weight of 3,000-8000 lbs. To be included in the current study aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 91 also 101 
fulfilled the following criteria: (a) engine horsepower of 150-499 engine) (b) exclusion of homebuilt 102 
aircraft (c) flights restricted to the purpose of business or personal use. Data were exported to Excel and, 103 
where applicable, de-duplicated in that program. This strategy returned 376 accidents comprised of 150 104 
and 226 fatal and non-fatal accidents respectively. A fatal accident was defined as any in which one, or 105 
more, occupants perished within 30 days of the accident (Code of Federal Regulations-49CFR830.2). 106 
Visual conditions were operationally defined as a vertical visibility (above the airport) equal to, 107 
or greater than, 3000 feet and a horizontal visibility of 3 statute miles or more. Conversely, instrument 108 
flight conditions (also referred to herein as degraded or reduced visibility) constituted weather where the 109 
vertical visibility value was less than 3000 feet or horizontal visibility was lower than 3 statute miles. 110 
Lethality of accidents was  defined as the percentage of occupants sustaining fatal injuries. 111 
 Accident causes and contributing factors categories used a classification scheme identical to the 112 
NTSB final report.  Abbreviations were as follows: Convective WX, thunderstorms; FMC/SD, failure to 113 
maintain control/spatial disorientation; FMOTC, failure to maintain obstacle/terrain clearance; Fuel, fuel 114 
exhaustion/contamination/mismanagement; landing/takeoff- errors in the landing/takeoff phase. The 115 
planned accident flight distance was computed point to point using the AOPA FlyQ Web tool 116 
(http://www.aopa.org/flightplanning/flyqweb/index.cfm).  Denominator data (total annual flight hour data 117 
for the twin engine piston aircraft fleet designated for personal/business purpose) for determining accident 118 
rate was obtained from the FAA 119 
(http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/general_aviation/). The methodology used for 120 
collection of data for the FAA survey has been described in a previous study [1]. 121 
2.1 Statistics 122 
 All statistical analyses were performed using the SPSS (version 22) software package. Chi Square 123 
and Fishers Exact (the latter test used when expected frequencies were < 5 [7]) methods were employed 124 
to determine if a difference in fatal accident proportions comparing the initial time period and a  125 
subsequent period was statistically significant. For a test of trend for fatal accident proportions across all 126 
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time periods, a Chi-Square linear-by-linear association output was used for trend assessment [2]. Chi 127 
square analysis was also employed to determine if the percentage of the various accident causes under 128 
visual and instrument weather conditions were statistically significantly different.  129 
 Logistic regression was used to identify risk factors for fatal accidents using 95% confidence 130 
intervals. However, the analysis was hindered by the problem of missing data for several parameters. For 131 
this reason and since  independent variables are often associated with each other, a two-step approach as 132 
advocated prior [12] was performed. First, a uni-variable analysis was undertaken on parameters related 133 
to airman demographics [4,14], flight experience [14,17] and certification [10], aircraft characteristics [8], 134 
weather and lighting conditions [3,10,14] and accident flight distance [10]. Second, a multi-variable 135 
analysis was performed to statistically adjust the estimated effect of each variable in the model for 136 
differences in the distributions of and association among the other independent variables [12]. Risk 137 
factors identified from the bi-variable analysis and showing a Wald significance (which assesses the 138 
contribution of each predictor [7]) of p<0.05 were advanced into the multi-variable model building. Here 139 
a  “block entry” method was used where each covariable was added sequentially. If the change in the Chi 140 
square value between models was statistically significant (p<0.05) then the corresponding parameter was 141 
deemed as improving the strength of the model. 142 
3.0 RESULTS 143 
3.1 Accident Rate and Temporal Change over a Decade. 144 
  For the 2002-2004 period, there were 11.3 accidents per 100,000 flight hours (Figure 1-bar 145 
graph). There was little evidence of change over the subsequent time periods with an accident rate of 10.9 146 
for the most recent (2011-2012) time frame. 147 
 The fatal accident rate was then determined over the decade. Across all time periods, there was a 148 
non-statistically significant linear trend (p=0.084). Fatal accident rates were also compared with the 149 
earliest time period (2002-2004). For this period, 39% (46/116) of accidents in twin engine aircraft 150 
operating under 14CFR Part 91 were fatal (Figure 1 line graph). However, compared with the 2002-2004 151 
time frame, the fatal accident rates for the subsequent time periods were non-significant as determined 152 
using a Chi Square Test.  153 
3.2 Accident Cause Distribution.  154 
 The causes of non-fatal accidents (Figure 2) was then determined using NTSB data. Surprisingly, 155 
the largest percentage (36%) of accidents (86/229) were ascribed to malfunctions of which 84 could be 156 
sub-categorized. Nearly half of the malfunctions (n=37) related to the landing gear or a brake system 157 
failure. Failure of landing gear/brake system for 3 of the 37 non-fatal accidents may have been secondary 158 
to a hard landing. Loss of engine power and failure of the fuel system accounted for 26% (22/84) and 159 
11%  (9/84) of malfunctions respectively. Errors during the landing and takeoff phases of flight accounted 160 
for nearly one quarter (58/229) of non-fatal accidents while 14.4% (33/229) of accidents were ascribed to 161 
fuel exhaustion/contamination/mismanagement. 162 
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 Accident causes for fatal accidents were then determined across all lighting conditions but 163 
separating accidents by instrument and visual conditions (Table 1). The sum of the percentage of  164 
accident causes per weather category equals a value of 100. The highest percentage (28%) of fatal 165 
accidents (13/47) for operations in degraded visibility were due to instrument approach deficiencies; 166 
although unsurprisingly under visual conditions no accidents were attributed to this cause. Similar to non-167 
fatal accidents, the greatest percentage (27%) of fatal accidents under visual conditions was attributed to a 168 
malfunction (27/101) involving an engine(s), instrument panel, flight control surfaces, fuel system or a 169 
cabin heater. Of 35 accidents in visual and instrument conditions combined, 25 were attributed to a loss of 170 
power in one, or in a few cases, both engines. Importantly, the NTSB cited a failure to follow single 171 
engine procedures as a contributing factor in the majority (20) of accidents related to loss of engine 172 
power. The percentage of accidents due to this cause was lower under instrument weather conditions 173 
(17% or 8/47 accidents), and a Fisher’s Exact Test indicated that this difference was indeed statistically 174 
significant (p<0.01). Failure to maintain control/spatial disorientation accounted for 13%  (13/101 ) of 175 
fatal accidents and was unchanged (15% or 7/47 accidents) by degraded visibility (p=0.53). Similarly, 176 
between 12-15% of fatal accidents (12/101 and 7/47 accidents under visual and instrument conditions 177 
respectively) were attributed to failure to maintain obstacle/terrain clearance. Perhaps not surprising, and 178 
in contrast to the data for non-fatal accidents (Figure 2), a much higher (2-5X) percentage of fatal crashes 179 
was ascribed to aerodynamic stalls. Accidents related to fuel (exhaustion/contamination-180 
/mismanagement) accounted for 12 (12/101) and 6% (3/47) of fatal crashes under visual and instrument 181 
weather conditions respectively although this difference was not statistically significant (p=0.36). 182 
3.3 Lethality of Accidents. 183 
 The lethality of accidents was then determined as a function of accident cause and degraded 184 
visibility (Table 2). Although the numbers were small, encountering convective weather (thunderstorms), 185 
leading to in-flight break-up in some cases, was the most lethal with all occupants sustaining fatal injuries 186 
irrespective of visibility conditions. Similarly, accidents due to a failure to maintain control/spatial 187 
disorientation carried a 93% (14/15) and 78% (7/9) lethality rate under visual and instrument weather 188 
conditions respectively. Interestingly, fuel-related accidents and crashes attributed to a malfunction both 189 
carried a lower lethality rate than the aforementioned causes. For fuel-related accidents, 29% (12/42) and 190 
50% (3/6) of occupants were fatally injured for operations conducted in visual and instrument conditions 191 
respectively although this difference was not statistically significant (p=0.36). In contrast, for accidents 192 
due to malfunctions, a lower percentage of occupants fatally injured was evident for operations conducted 193 
under visual (25% or 27/108) compared with those under instrument (67% or 8/12) conditions (p <0.01). 194 
3.4 Fatal Accident Causes at Night. 195 
 A prior study reported an increased risk of fatality for general aviation operations conducted at 196 
night [14]. With this in mind, the author sought to identify the most frequent accident causes at night. 197 
Although the total number of fatal accidents at night was relatively small (n=33) and precluded a 198 
8 
 
statistical comparison with accidents during daylight, failure to maintain obstacle/terrain clearance was 199 
the most prevalent cause leading to 36% (12/33) of crashes (Figure 3). Not surprisingly, there were few 200 
such accidents during the day. At night, of twelve accidents attributed to this cause, the majority (75%) 201 
were not operating under an instrument flight plan. Aerodynamic stall/failure to maintain control and 202 
instrument approach deficiencies accounted for 27 (9/33) and 30% (10/33) of fatal accidents at night 203 
respectively.   204 
3.5 Risk Factors for Fatal Flights. 205 
 Risk factors for a fatal accident were then determined. Of 377 accidents only 186 were complete 206 
for the 12 parameters of interest (listed in Table 3). Of the complete cases, there were 60 and 126 207 
fatalities and non-fatalities respectively equating to a value of five events per variable (60/12) far fewer 208 
than the recommended minimum value of 10 [21]. This necessitated a two-step approach (uni-variable 209 
and then multi-variable analysis) as described in the Methods. 210 
 In the uni-variable analysis (Table 3), advanced pilot certification (comparing either commercial 211 
or airline transport pilot (ATP) certification with private license) was not associated with a diminished 212 
risk for a fatal crash. Likewise the addition of an instrument certificate did not carry a lower risk for a 213 
fatal accident outcome. Note that the population cohort (n=375) used for the analysis of benefit of the 214 
IFR-add on is larger (n=372) than the group used to determine the benefits of advanced certification 215 
(commercial, ATP). The reason for this discrepancy is the censoring of records for aviators holding 216 
military and foreign certificates from the latter analysis. Regarding aircraft aerodynamics, landing speed 217 
is a function of its weight and it is well recognized that the impact force imposed on the occupant(s) is a 218 
square of the forward velocity of the aircraft [8]. Since this study included aircraft with a broad maximum 219 
certified weight range (3,000-8000 lbs.) this parameter could be associated with an elevated fatality rate. 220 
However logistic regression revealed an unchanged risk (with confidence intervals crossing unity) for a 221 
fatal flight as a function of maximum certified weight. 222 
 Five parameters were identified as risk factors from the uni-variable analysis: instrument weather 223 
conditions, light conditions, whether the accident was on, or off, the airport, occurrence of a post-impact 224 
fire and a flight distance over 300 nm. Note that for this analysis 323 complete records were available for 225 
analysis (197 and 126 non-fatal and fatal respectively). The number of events per variable was therefore 226 
25 (126/5) and well in excess of a value of 10 suggested for logistic regression [21].  227 
 Degraded visibility, night, off-airport landings and a post-impact fire all contributed to a robust 228 
multi-variable model (Chi Square 168.735, p<0.001) with a predictive value of 82% compared with 61% 229 
for the null model. However, flight distance over 300 nm did not improve the strength of the model. As in 230 
the uni-variable analysis, operations conducted at night showed an elevated risk for a fatal outcome (OR 231 
3.68)-Table 4. Additionally, in the multi-variable analysis the data also showed an increased risk of a fatal 232 
accident for an off airport landing (OR 14.81) and a post-impact fire (OR 7.24). These findings are in line 233 
with previous studies [11,14,22], which aggregated single and multi-engine airplanes, showing a strong 234 
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association between a fatal accident and either an off airport landing [14,22] or a post-impact fire [11,14]. 235 
A check for the biasing effect of collinearity in the multi-variable model revealed variance inflation factor 236 
values of less than 10 mitigating this concern [18]. 237 
4.0 DISCUSSION 238 
 To the author’s knowledge this is the first study to exclusively report on accident causes in twin, 239 
piston engine powered airplanes for operations conducted under 14CFR Part 91. Most studies 240 
[10,14,19,29] on general aviation accidents aggregate single and multi-engine aircraft despite the fact that 241 
the flight profile for these aircraft differ substantially. Twin engine aircraft typically fly faster, longer 242 
distances, at higher altitudes and carry an increased fuel load. Equally important, as a consequence of 243 
their increased weight, landing speeds are higher which translates into a higher kinetic energy transferred 244 
to the occupants on a crash landing. Thus not surprisingly, the lethality rate of multi-engine aircraft are 245 
higher than for their single engine counterparts [13].  246 
 The high percentage of fatal accidents attributed to a malfunction irrespective of visibility 247 
conditions (22% average for both weather conditions) was surprising. This proportion was substantially 248 
higher than the 4% cited in a prior publication focused on accidents occurring during instrument 249 
approaches [5]. However, the latter study included air taxi operations conducted under the more stringent 250 
14CFR Part 135 rules and was restricted to a single phase of flight: two factors that likely contribute to a 251 
lower rate. The percentage of fatal twin engine aircraft accidents attributed to the malfunction category 252 
was also slightly higher than the 17% reported by the 2010 Nall report on general aviation for that year 253 
[13].  254 
What was particularly disconcerting in this study was the number of fatal accidents involving a 255 
loss of engine power. While arguably two engines provide an additional level of redundancy in the event 256 
of an inoperative engine, adherence to single engine procedures is of paramount importance. 257 
Unfortunately, a failure to follow single engine procedures as, cited by the NTSB, was a contributing 258 
factor in the majority of the accidents related to loss of engine power. 259 
 Regarding the 100% lethality of accidents due to convective weather, common practice is to teach 260 
aviators flying light aircraft (inclusive of single and multi-engine airplanes) to decrease airspeed to 261 
maneuvering airspeed (VA) to avoid airframe stresses that may cause structural failure. However 262 
thunderstorms are characterized by strong updrafts and downdrafts which may cause airspeed fluctuations 263 
of 15-25 knots thereby exceeding VA. A pilot attempting to maintain VA will exceed this speed with an 264 
increased possibility of airframe failure (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals-265 
/aviation/pilot_handbook/media/PHAK-Errata-Sheet.pdf Items # 19 & 20).  266 
 Interestingly, examination of the accident cause profile revealed some key differences between 267 
twin and single engine powered aircraft the latter which the author reported on previously [25]. 268 
Aerodynamic stalls contributed to a lower percentage (14 compared with 22%) of fatal crashes in twin 269 
engine aircraft operating in visual conditions compared with single engine powered aircraft. Likewise, 270 
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failure to maintain control/spatial disorientation was cited more frequently (25 and 15% respectively) as a 271 
fatal accident cause under degraded visibility in single engine aircraft [25]. In contrast, the percentage of 272 
accidents caused by instrument approach deficiencies in reduced visibility was similar for both single and 273 
twin engine aircraft (30 and 28% respectively). This latter finding is not surprising and reflects a 274 
continued concern by general aviation pilots as to the problem of maintaining instrument currency [28]. 275 
Notwithstanding these observations, a key difference between both studies was the pilot population; 276 
exclusively private pilots for the single engine aircraft cohort in contrast to a mixed population of aviators 277 
with advanced certification (the majority constituted by commercial or ATP pilots) in the current study. 278 
This difference could very well contribute to the lower level of aerodynamic stalls as a commercial 279 
license requires pilots to maintain control of the aircraft under conditions approaching a stall to a higher 280 
standard than aviators tested for the private pilot certificate (US Department of Transportation documents 281 
FAA-S-8081-12C and FAA-S8081-14B respectively). Moreover, earlier studies had reported a reduced 282 
involvement of ATP pilots in general aviation accidents [23] as well as fewer pilot errors [16]. On the 283 
other hand the logistic regression showed little evidence of a risk reduction for a fatal accident with 284 
advanced certification arguing against this possibility at least with respect to twin engine aircraft. As to 285 
the concordance of accidents caused by instrument approach deficiency this may reflect the very high 286 
percentage of IFR-certified aviators in both studies; 100% for a  prior report by the author of single 287 
engine aircraft [25] and over 85% for the current study on twin engine aircraft.  288 
 That advancing age did not represent a risk factor for a fatal accident in the current investigation 289 
was somewhat surprising as aging is associated with diminished cognitive function. Indeed, prior 290 
publications [4,14] have cited advancing age as a risk factor for a fatal outcome. However, for the study 291 
by Li and Baker [14] the elevated risk was modest (Odds Ratio= 1.7) with a lower confidence interval of 292 
1.0.  Similarly, Bazargan and Guzhva [4] reported a small elevated risk (OR 1.21) with advancing age 293 
comparing aviators 60 years and older with a reference group of pilots spanning the ages of 30-39 years.  294 
 The current study demonstrated that instrument  and lighting conditions, an off-airport accident as 295 
well as a fire were all risk factors for a fatal accident in twin engine aircraft operating under 14CFR Part 296 
91.  It will be very interesting in future studies to determine if these aforementioned risk factors are 297 
identical for fatal accidents in single-engine aircraft. 298 
 The study had a number of limitations. First and foremost this study was retrospective. Second, in 299 
some instances the number of events attributed to a particular accident cause was small especially for the 300 
analysis of night accidents. Finally, there may have been risk factors that were not captured in this 301 
research. For example, recent flight experience times are often absent from the NTSB report and 302 
precluded an analysis of this co-variate in the logistic regression analysis. Also, accident aircraft were 303 
likely equipped with a wide range of avionics from the traditional analog displays through to the current 304 
electronic flight displays a factor that was not addressed in this study. The latter systems demand an 305 
11 
 
increased cognitive function and maintaining proficiency is more difficult compared with the traditional 306 
analog instrumentation [20].  307 
 In conclusion, this study emphasizes training areas that should be given priority in regard to pilots 308 
flying twin-engine aircraft. First and foremost, increased emphasis should be given to single engine 309 
procedures upon loss of power in one engine. Second, the high proportion of fatal accidents in instrument 310 
weather conditions and at night due to instrument approach deficiency and loss of control/spatial 311 
disorientation argues for increased training in these areas. The recent advent of affordable full motion 312 
FAA-approved flight simulators provides a means of achieving this objective. Third, pilots should be 313 
made aware of appropriate speed selection for turbulence penetration in inadvertent penetration of 314 
convective weather. Finally, for night operations under visual conditions general aviation pilots should be 315 
encouraged to conduct flights in accordance with instrument flight rules towards diminishing the 316 
proportion of accidents attributed to failure to maintain obstacle/terrain clearance.  317 
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6.0 LEGENDS 392 
Figure 1. Temporal Change in Twin-Engine Accident Rate. 393 
 The change in all (fatal and non-fatal combined) accident rate (bar graph) normalized to FAA 394 
data for twin engine aircraft used for personal or business purpose for the indicated time period. 395 
n=accident number (fatal and non-fatal combined). The line graph depicts the percentage of all accidents 396 
that were fatal for the corresponding time period. P values indicate the statistical level relative to the first 397 
time period (2002-2004). 398 
 399 
Figure 2. Distribution of Causes of Non-Fatal Accidents. 400 
 The distribution of accident cause is shown where the sum of all non-fatal accidents equals 100. 401 
Accident cause was per the NTSB final report. FMOTC, failure to maintain obstacle/terrain clearance; 402 
Fuel, fuel exhaustion/contamination/mismanagement; landing/takeoff- errors in the landing/takeoff phase.  403 
Other –failure to maintain control, icing (structural, carburetor), instrument approach deficiencies, 404 
overfilling fuel tank, windshear, mid-air collision,  undetermined.  n-number of accidents. 405 
 406 
Figure 3. Comparison of Fatal Accident Causes at Night and Day. 407 
 The distribution of accident causes at night and day is depicted where the sum of fatal accidents 408 
equals 100 for each of the two lighting conditions. Accident cause was per the NTSB final report and 409 
abbreviations as per Figure 2. Other –checklist incomplete, exceed aircraft maximum design limits,  icing, 410 
landing/takeoff errors, pilot incapacitation, undetermined.  n-number of accidents. 411 
 412 





Table 1. Distribution of Fatal Accident Causes. 416 
 Visual conditions were defined as a vertical visibility >3000 feet and  horizontal visibility >3 417 
statute miles. For instrument flight conditions these values were <3000 feet and/or <3 miles respectively. 418 
Accident cause was per the NTSB final report. FMC/SD, failure to maintain control/spatial disorientation; 419 
FMOTC, failure to maintain obstacle/terrain clearance; Fuel, fuel 420 
exhaustion/contamination/mismanagement;  Other – mid-air collision,  improper starting procedure, 421 
undetermined.  N-number of fatal accidents, (%) percentage of accidents in that category for the indicated 422 
weather condition. ND-not done. 423 
 424 
Table 2. Occupants Fatally Injured per Accident. 425 
 The number and percentage of occupants fatally injured is shown as a function of accident cause 426 
and weather conditions.  Visual and instrument weather conditions were defined as per Table 1.  N= 427 
number of airplane occupants fatally injured for a given accident cause. Convective WX, thunderstorms; 428 
FMC/SD, failure to maintain control/spatial disorientation; FMOTC, failure to maintain obstacle/terrain 429 
clearance; Fuel, fuel exhaustion/contamination/mismanagement;   430 
 431 
Table 3. Uni-variable analysis of Pilot Demographics Certification, Flight History and Aircraft 432 
Characteristics as Risk Factors for a Fatal Flight. 433 
 Logistical regression of putative risk factors associated with a fatal accident. N- number of 434 
accidents (fatal, non-fatal combined) in analysis. ATP, airline transport pilot. Visual and instrument 435 
conditions were defined as per Table 1. Only those aviators with IFR certification in the airplane category 436 
were included as IFR-certified. Ref, referent. 437 
 438 
Table 4. Multi-variable analysis of Risk Factors for a Fatal Flight. 439 
 Multi-variable logistical analysis of risk factors for a fatal accident selected from uni-variable 440 
analysis. N=323 accidents (fatal, non-fatal combined) in analysis. Visual and instrument conditions were 441 
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